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Abstract
We estimate the informal-formal sector pay gap throughout the conditional wage
distribution using panel data from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. We control
for time-invariant unobservables and identication is stemming from inter-sector
movers. We control for observables in a non-linear way using propensity score
reweighting and carefully check for potential measurement errors. Using similar
denitions of informality, we obtain consistent results for all three countries: In-
formally employed workers earn much less than formal workers primarily because
of lower observable and unobservable skills. Estimates of the conditional wage gap
show that they are also underpaid compared to their formal sector counterparts.
In all three countries, the informal wage penalty is larger in the lower part of the
conditional distribution and tends to disappear at the top, i.e., the informal sector
increases wage dispersion. The magnitudes of these e¤ects vary across countries,
with the largest penalties in lower conditional quantiles of South Africa and more
modest wage gaps in Latin America. We suggest explanations in line with di¤erent
legal and labor market conditions.
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1 Introduction
Most developing and emerging economies are characterized by the presence of informal
employment. While many denitions exist, an informal, unregulated labor market can be
seen as one where workers are unregistered and not liable to taxes and contribution, not
subject to labor market regulations and excluded from social security coverage (pension,
benets) or the right to a minimum wage.1 Such type of employment represents a large
share of the working force worldwide and a long-term feature of the labor markets in
developing countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America (see the di¤erent studies
referenced in Perry et al., 2006, ed.). While it is often suspected to cumulate low earnings,
bad work conditions and poor employment benets, evidence is mixed mainly because of
the highly heterogeneous nature of informal employment. The existence of an informal
sector must have crucial implications on the earnings structure, on the functioning of labor
markets overall and, ultimately, on the policies that should be adopted by governments
to maximize the welfare of a nation. The present paper aims to address the rst point,
namely to improve the measurement of earnings distributions in emerging economies and,
more precisely, to provide a distributional analysis of the informal-formal pay gap an
important aspect to understanding wage structures and the notion of decent work in
developing countries.
Several reasons can explain why workers in undeclared and uncovered jobs are paid di¤er-
ently from identical, formally employed workers. An informal wage penalty may arise if
labor market regulation (minimum wages, higher unionization) not only keeps a large part
of the labor force out of formal employment but also pushes up formal sector wages above
market-clearing levels. It may also derive from lower bargaining power among informally
employed workers (Carneiro and Henley, 1998). These situations often but not always 
characterize informal workers in rms which are themselves unregistered. In that case, an
informal wage penalty may also be the result of a rm size e¤ect. Indeed, larger rms pay
more and, at the same time, are more likely to be formal because of larger exposure to the
risk of being caught defaulting (see Badaoui et al., 2010). Finally, informal sector wage
penalties may reect compensating di¤erentials if non-pecuniary amenities are attached
to informal employment, such as more exible hours, training, and tax savings.2 Inversely,
informal jobs could command higher earnings to compensate for the value of lost fringe
1Note that we focus on informal versus formal salary work in the present paper (we extend the
comparison to self-employment in Bargain and Kwenda, 2011). For this reason, one could argue that
informal employment rather than informal sector may be a more accurate term. We use both
expression indi¤erently, the latter being consistent with the general terminology in the literature.
2For low-skilled youth and older workers, informal salaried jobs are sometimes described as o¤ering an
entry point to the labor market that partially allows them to remedy decient schooling or the obsolescence
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benets such as medical coverage and old age pension (net of payroll contributions), un-
less workers do not value these benets.3 Informal wages could also be higher (or the
informal sector penalty be reduced) if employers have to pay some taxes or contribution
before paying a formal wage.
This range of possible explanations calls for an appropriate characterization of the informal
sector wage gap. Estimations of the mean gap, as suggested in several studies and for
several countries (e.g., Badaoui et al., 2008, for South Africa), conceal the variety of
situations that may exist. Instead, the present paper suggests using quantile regression
(QR) to assess informal wage penalties at di¤erent points along the conditional wage
distribution. Since workers may sort into formal and informal jobs, acting on the returns to
their skills and competencies in each sector, we run xed e¤ects quantile regressions (FE-
QR) to control for workers (time-invariant) unobserved characteristics. The informal-
formal sector wage gap is identied on cross-sector movers. For this reason, we particularly
focus on potential measurement errors and provide extensive robustness checks. Finally,
it is important to interpret our estimates, obtained by regressions on the pooled sample of
informal and formal workers, as conditional wage di¤erentials between sectors. That is,
controlling for the distributions of workerscharacteristics across sectors (the "between"
e¤ect), we focus on the potentially di¤erent pay settings between sectors for otherwise
identical workers (the "within" e¤ect). Since it may be restrictive to control linearly for
workerscharacteristics, we also improve the comparison by adjusting our estimation using
matching methods. The robust combination of xed-e¤ect estimation and propensity score
weighting is originally extended to quantile estimations.
Importantly, we replicate our estimations for three di¤erent countries. Previous studies
usually consider one country at a time, using specic methods and denitions of informal-
ity to identify the conditional sector wage gap. We suggest applying a uniform estimation
and identication strategy as well as a very comparable denition of informality to three
emerging economies which have received much attention in the literature, namely South
Africa, Mexico and Brazil. This harmonized empirical approach should contribute mak-
ing the nds more generalizeable to labor markets in developing countries in general.4 In
of skills through on-the-job training unavailable to them in formal salaried jobs. For women, the balance
between work and family responsibilities may render the greater exibility and autonomy of informal jobs
a better match.
3This can happen for many reasons: a lack of information about benets and the functioning of social
security programs, the fact that these services are universally provided or traditionally provided through
family support, or the fact that workers are aware of ine¢ ciencies in formal social protection.
4It is also interesting to replicate the exercise for countries with di¤erent data quality. The small
South African sample, used in other contributions (e.g., Badaoui et al., 2008), yields relatively less precise
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fact, despite di¤erent degree of informality between these countries, and contrasted labor
market history and legal institutions, results point to consistent patterns over all three
countries: First, salary workers in the informal sector are underpaid compared to their
formal sector counterparts, yet the penalty is small for a majority of workers. Second,
the penalty is smaller after controlling for xed e¤ects, i.e., the very large unconditional
wage gap is not only explained by betterobserved characteristics in the formal sector
but also by better unobserved skills. This means that pooled cross-sectional estimates of
wage di¤erentials greatly overstate the actual wage penalties su¤ered by informal work-
ers. Third, quantile estimations unveil another consistent pattern, namely that informal
wage penalties are signicant in the lower part of the conditional distribution while they
tend to disappear at the top. In other words, those who do badly conditional on their
observed characteristics do especially poorly in informal salary work. That the informal
sector increases wage dispersion reects the heterogeneity of workers/jobs in this sector
it is also consistent with the wage compression that can be expected in the regulated
sector.
Beyond qualitatively comparable patterns, we nd di¤erences in the magnitude of these
e¤ects between countries, which are in line with di¤erent institutional and legal back-
grounds. The largest informal wage penalties are found in the lower half of the conditional
wage distribution in South Africa. This is suggestive of the fact that legal advantages
in formal employment (e.g., unionization) are more e¤ective in this country, resulting in
workers left out of formal jobs and/or possibly stronger bargaining power in the formal
sector. These explanatory factors do not apply uniformly over the wage distribution,
however. Indeed, a half of the informal sector resembles that in the two Latin American
countries, characterized by more modest wage gaps overall. Higher employer costs at-
tached to formal employment in Brazil and Mexico may simultaneously explain the large
extent of informal work and the relatively smaller sector wage gap in these countries, as
rms possibly recoup high employerspayroll taxes paid to hire formal workers. Finally,
we suggest that informal wage penalties may only partly be related to the rm size e¤ect,
especially at the top of the conditional distribution and more frequently in Brazil, where
many informal workers are to be found in large formal rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 positions the paper in the literature, presents
the evaluation problem and provides some background information. Section 3 describes
the data and the construction of raw wage di¤erences after accounting for taxes in the
estimations than for other countries. Results for this country can nonetheless be compared and reconciled
with the more robust results on the large Mexican data. We also address the potential problem of using
short panels by replicating our results for di¤erent panel durations on Mexican data and by comparing
our baseline with estimators which do not su¤er from the incidental parameter problem.
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formal sector. The econometric approach is detailed in section 4. In Section 5, we present
and discuss the empirical results and several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
We rst position our contribution in the literature on informal-formal sector wage gaps.
We discuss the evaluation problem at stake in the paper. Finally, we explain our denition
of informal employment and provide some background information on labor markets in
the three countries under study.
2.1 Literature and Contribution
Several previous studies have estimated the conditional wage gap between informal and
formal sectors. We provide several references for Brazil, South Africa and Mexico and
other countries throughout this section (we do not aim at an exhaustive survey but simply
cite some of the studies which provide relevant comparison points). They are summarized
in Table 1, including the di¤erent estimation techniques and the denition of informality.5
Most studies are a¤ected by at least one of the three following shortcomings that we
simultaneously address in our empirical approach.
First, most studies focus on comparisons at the mean. This necessarily conceals impor-
tant information and may explain in addition to the use of di¤erent methodologies and
sample selection the di¢ culty to reconcile the di¤erent estimates obtained in the liter-
ature. For instance, some studies nd a large informal wage penalty (e.g., Funkhouser,
1997, for El Salvador, Gong and Van Soest, 2002, for Mexico), even after controlling for
workersheterogeneity, while others show that this penalty tends to disappear in that case
(e.g., Pratap and Quintin, 2006, for Argentina, Badaoui et al., 2008, for South Africa).
Ignoring distributional issues is also a strong limitation, given the intricate question of
how informality a¤ects earnings inequality. Notice that a few studies make use of quantile
estimations to estimate sector wage gaps along the conditional wage distribution. Most
of them ignore the problem of selection, however, and do not attempt to control for un-
observables (e.g., in Perry et al., 2006, ed.). Rare exceptions exist and essentially adopt
quantile regressions corrected for selection using instrumental variables, as in the appli-
cation of Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008) for Brazil. We compare our results to theirs
in what follows.
5The lower panel of this table contains studies not directly related to the measurement of wage
di¤erentials or to the countries under study, yet interesting for the way informality is dened see the
discussion below.
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Second, some authors have attempted to deal with the unobserved characteristics that
a¤ect both the selection into a particular sector and earnings levels by explicitly introduc-
ing selection equations. Arguably, a particular challenge pertains to nding convincing
instruments for the selection, i.e., variables that explain location into a particular sector
without a¤ecting wages. Studies rarely discuss the relevance of their instruments, how-
ever, nor do they conduct sensitivity checks on the choice of instruments.6 Another issue,
related to the rst point, is that introducing selection into quantile estimation is not a
straightforward procedure and shows some di¢ culties.7
In the present paper, we adopt the usual alternative method to control for unobserved
heterogeneity, namely the use of panel data to estimate models with xed e¤ects (FE).
This is also the path followed in Badaoui et al. (2008) and Botelho and Ponczek (2011),
two studies closely related to ours. Their analysis is however limited to estimations at
the mean and for one country at a time (South Africa and Brazil respectively). For the
reasons motivated in the introduction, and more particularly because South Africa is seen
as a particular case given its relatively small informal sector, we believe it is important
to provide a genuine comparison of di¤erent countries with di¤erent backgrounds.
Interestingly, the literature has already exploited panel information on workersmoves
between formal and informal sectors. This was used to simply calculate the wage changes
of those moving across sectors (e.g, Funkhouser, 1997, or Maloney, 1999) or to directly
learn from transitions across sectors (Bosch and Maloney, 2007).8 Our empirical strategy
is di¤erent and consists in using switches across sectors to capture the informal wage
6For instance for Brazil, Carneiro and Henley (2001) and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008) use
establishment size, position in the household, payment methods, other household income, work hours
and multiple job holding. Establishment size may indeed indicate informal employment, yet informality
cannot be reduced to a small rm e¤ect, as discussed below. A related concern applies to payment
methods. Critically, both variables are possibly correlated with wage levels. Other household income and
work hours may help to capture the possibility of entering informal employment for secondary workers
who require exible forms of employment for a better work-family balance (Marcouiller et al., 1997). This
type of instrument is however not relevant for male salary workers, i.e. the largest group and the focus
of our study. The same argument applies to whether the partner is already in the formal sector so that
the family is covered by social security (cf., Pratap and Quintin, 2006).
7The use of a selection equation and an approximation of the Mills ratio in the quantile estimation
is suggested by Buchinsky (1998) and adopted in Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008). As recently shown
in Huber and Melly (2011), this approach relies on the assumption of conditional independence between
the error terms and the regressors given the selection probability, an assumption which implies that all
quantile regression curves are parallel. This naturally limits considerably the usefulness of the quantile
regression method and the heterogeneity often found in estimates across quantiles actually reects a
violation of the conditional independence assumption.
8Gong et al. (2004) and Gong and van Soest (2002) also provide evidence on sector transitions and
(mean) earnings mobility in Mexico, using dynamic multinomial logit and random e¤ect models.
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gap while purging estimations from FE. We describe the general principle in the next
sub-section.
Third, standard wage equations are potentially vulnerable to misspecication problems,
notably because of the linearity assumption on the covariates and the use of observa-
tions outside the common support of individual characteristics for formal and informal
workers. Matching techniques, which provide the wage outcomes of formal and informal
workers only with comparable observed characteristics, have recently been used by Pratap
and Quintin (2006) for the analysis of the sector wage gap in Argentina. To reduce the
problem of matching workers on several dimensions, they adopt the method of propensity
score matching, as usually recommended. For estimations of mean e¤ects, Smith and
Todd (2005) also show that combining di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations and matching
techniques is more robust than traditional cross-section matching estimators, as it al-
lows selection on observables as well as time-invariant selection on unobservables. For
this reason, Pratap and Quintin (2006) and Badaoui et al. (2008) use a "di¤erence-in-
di¤erence" propensity score matching approach to estimate the mean informal wage gap.
The present paper extends this approach to quantile estimations, following the propensity
score reweighting technique suggested by Firpo (2007).
2.2 The Evaluation Problem
Measuring the informal sector wage gap would require counterfactual information on the
wage obtained by an informally employed worker, were she employed in a similar job in
the formal sector. That is, we would like to estimate the pure e¤ect of informality as:
E[yit(1)]  E[yit(0)]; (1)
with yit(I) the earnings of individual i at time t when this person is in informal (I = 1)
or formal (I = 0) employment. We do not dispose of observations on the two possible
events (a person is either in formal or informal employment at period t). Usual practice
thus consists in comparing the earnings of workers in one and the other sector, controlling
for di¤erences in observed characteristics. It is possible to improve on this by using panel
information. FE estimations rst allow controlling for (time-invariant) unobservables
that may determine both selection into the informal sector and wages (e.g., unobserved
skills, risk aversion, tastes, etc.). In addition, sector switchers can be used to better
approximate the pure treatment e¤ect. For instance, using those moving from formal to
informal employment between periods 1 and 2, we can approximate the informality e¤ect
(1) using E[yi2(1)]  E[yi1(0)]: By analogy with the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach, we
need to adjust for possible trends in earnings over the two periods, which is assumed
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common to the two sectors. We do so by using "stayers" as a control group, for instance
those staying in formal employment. Thus the average treatment e¤ect is approximated
by:
fE[yi2(1)]  E[yi1(0)]g   fE[yi2(0)]  E[yi1(0)]g: (2)
The identication of conditional wage gaps on inter-sector movers requires some caution
however. First, as noted by Card (1996), the use of longitudinal estimators can be highly
sensitive to measurement errors: even a small fraction of misclassied workers can lead
to large biases if the true rate of mobility between sectors is low (attenuation bias). We
show that this rate is actually signicant and provide an extensive check for potential
measurement errors. We thoroughly examine the nature of sector switchers and pay
attention to possible asymmetrical e¤ects (depending on the direction of the move).
Second, a limitation of our approach holds in the necessary assumption that, conditional
on FE, sectoral switching is random. In other words, the treatment is assumed to be
entirely determined by observables and time-invariant unobservables. Whenever unob-
servable attributes change over time and their variation is correlated with the variations
in earnings and sector choice, the FE estimator is inconsistent. For example, if workers
anticipate their relative prospects in both sectors and choose a sector based on those ex-
pectations (which are not observed), then the transition from one sector to the other is
also endogenous.9 As noted above, we check hereafter for possible asymmetrical e¤ects
depending on the direction of the move. This is important indication since (unobservable)
time-specic reasons for transiting between sectors, e.g., productivity shocks, are likely to
be di¤erent in one or the other direction.
2.3 Dening Informality
There is generally no consensus on how to dene informality. Some studies opt for the
productive view, based on job types or rm size (usually rms of less than ve work-
ers). Since own-account workers and the owner of microrms are counted, this denition
overlaps with informal self-employment, which is not the focus of this study. Instead,
we adopt the so-called social security (or legalistic) view, whereby informality refers to
the lack/avoidance of formal registration, taxation and labor regulation as well as the
9Accounting for endogenous switching associated with time-varying unobservables would certainly
require more information and combining FE estimations with an instrumental variable approach to model
selection explicitly (see for instance Harding and Lamarche, 2009). As discussed in the previous sub-
section, however, convincing instruments are hard to nd in the present context. The task is even more
complicated since instruments would need to vary over time.
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lack of social security protection for workers. These aspects are important for welfare
considerations as informal sector workers may experience bad work conditions (e.g., no
social protection) at the same time as lower wages. Importantly, this legalistic view also
acknowledges the possible presence of informal employment within large rms and, hence,
corresponds to a much broader denition of informality than the productive view. This
aspect is particularly important rm size classications may be picking up the e¤ect of
rm size on wages rather than other specic e¤ects of informality and receive some at-
tention in section 5. In addition, the social security denition allows consistently adjusting
wages for taxes/social contributions paid by employees in the formal sector only.
With the data at hand, described in section 3, we can identify informality in a consis-
tent and comparable way for all countries. In Mexico employees have to contribute to
the social security agency (IMSS). Similarly, employees in Brazil must hold a labor card
(carteira assinada), the signing of which guarantees them access to formal labor protec-
tion. Therefore those wage employees not registered with the social security agency in
Mexico or not holding a signed labor card in Brazil are considered as informal salaried.
For South Africa, we follow Badaoui et al. (2008) who rely on questions regarding fringe
benets and other aspects of the job that can be used to identify the sector, in particular
questions regarding whether the rm provides medical aid and deducts unemployment in-
surance contributions. Table 1 shows that these legalistic denitions are in line with what
is frequently used in related studies for Brazil (e.g., Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2008),
Mexico (Gong et al., 2004, Calderon-Madrid, 1999) and South Africa (e.g., Badaoui et
al., 2008) as well as other countries characterized by informal employment.10
2.4 Labor Markets in Brazil, South Africa and Mexico
Existing evidence shows that informal labor markets are signicant in all three countries
under study. In Brazil, Carneiro and Henley (2001) indicate that informal employment,
dened as the proportion of salary workers without a signed labor card, represents around
25% of the labor force. Several factors are typically blamed for the presence of an informal
sector in Brazil, including taxes (de Paula and Scheinkman, 2006), stringent labor leg-
islations (Barros and Corseuil, 2001) and the enforcement of these regulations (Almeida
and Carneiro, 2008). The last two aspects have been particularly reinforced following the
10For the reason mentioned above, there is a shift in the literature in favor of the legalistic view
(cf. Perry et al., 2006). The productive approach seems nonetheless frequently used in the case of
Mexico, simply because the many studies focus on self-employed workers (Maloney, 1999, Gong and
van Soest, 2002, Marcouiller et al., 1997). Gong et al. (2004) nd some overlap between the three
usual denitions but social security coverage corresponds better to the rm size classication than to the
job-type denition.
9
1988 constitutional changes which increased the degree of workers protection and hence
labor costs for rms (see Ulyssea, 2010). We conjecture that rms may try to recoup these
legal costs by decreasing formal wages. Also, the reduction in state regulation of collective
bargaining has led to increasing rent sharing and insider trade union bargaining power,
the consequence of which is not rising open unemployment but a growing displacement
of workers into the informal sector (Carneiro and Henley, 1998).
In Mexico, Marcouiller et al. (1997) show that the informal sector represents 31% of
total employment when dened according to rm size but more than 43% when the social
security denition is used. The informal sector in Mexico has been described as a desirable
and voluntary-entry segment of the labor market in many studies (for instance Maloney,
1999, Marcouiller et al., 1997). Yet this statement concerns the self-employed rather
than salary workers. As explained in the next section, it seems important to focus on
each group separately. In the present study, we question whether informal salary work,
the vast majority of informal work in Mexico, also shows unusual patterns or is, on the
contrary, similar to informal employment in other Latin American countries like Brazil.
According to Kingdon and Knight (2007), the informal sector represents 24% of the South
African labor force in 2003. Many studies, surveyed by these authors, report that labor
standards, employment protection legislation and the presence of strong trade unions
explain the presence of informality even if some dynamic segments of the informal labor
market also exist (cf. Cichello et al., 2005). Informal salary work alone accounts for 11%
of total employment (cf., Badaoui et al., 2008), which is smaller than for other countries
yet the informal sector keeps on growing, as noted by Kingdon and Knight (2004). The
reason for a relatively small informal sector is its coexistence with classic unemployment,
which represents 29% of the total labor force and is due to higher reservation wages
compared to lower income countries. Indeed the unemployed who receive some support
from within or beyond the household (social grants) may prefer to remain outside the
low-tier informal sector. For those who cannot benet from these safety nets, however,
low-productivity informal jobs can be seen as last resort, underpaid activities. Conditional
wage distributions estimated in the present study help to quantify this specic, most
deprived group of workers.
3 Data and Measure of the Raw Wage Gap
3.1 Data and Selection
We collect panel datasets with enough information to estimate earnings equation in all
three countries, i.e. surveys providing job characteristics, incomes, work duration, demo-
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graphics and education levels of the workers. For Brazil, we use the Monthly Employ-
ment Survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego, PME) conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geograae Estatistica (IBGE). This is a monthly household survey on the six largest
metropolitan areas of Brazil (i.e., Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Sal-
vador and Sao Paulo). Households are interviewed four months in a row and re-interviewed
eight months later for another four months. We create a panel with observations that are
a year apart, focusing on years 2002 to 2007. For South Africa, we use the labor Force
Survey (LFS), a bi-annual rotating panel conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA)
and covering all provincial areas. Twenty percent of the sampling units are rotated out
of the survey and replaced with a new sample every six months; workers are therefore
observed ve times at most over a two-and-a-half year period. We use the waves of Sep-
tember 2001 to March 2007. For Mexico, we use the Mexican National Occupation and
Employment Survey (ENOE) conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geo-
graphica e Informatica (INEGI). This is a quarterly survey where workers are observed
at most ve times over a ve-quarter period. We use data from the rst quarter 2005 to
the third quarter 2008.
Since households are identied over time but individuals are not, we construct panels of
individual workers by linking persons within households over time on the basis of gender,
race and age. For the baseline estimates, we select workers that are observed at least twice
in the data.11 We restrict samples to urban male workers aged 15-65 and not engaged
in any form of education or training. We focus on men because a large proportion of
women in all three countries are not active or are engaged in unpaid work. We select
only workers in the private sector, which excludes unpaid family workers (whose implicit
earnings are di¢ cult to evaluate) and public sector employees. For the latter, there are
indeed important di¤erences in institutional mechanisms regulating wages, both across
countries and compared to the private sector. In South Africa (resp. Brazil), whites
and asians (resp. asians) are excluded from the sample as they are disproportionately
represented in the formal sector.12
11The attrition resulting from this procedure corresponds to 32% of the initial sample for Brazil, 22% for
South Africa and 18% for Mexico. Further work should check for the possibility of non-random attrition
that could bias results. An interesting procedure would be, in particular, to derive Manski bounds of the
conditional wage gaps in this context. There are, as yet, no simple method to obtain them in a quantile
estimation framework and even less so when accounting for xed e¤ects. For partial identication of
quantile treatment e¤ects in the presence of sample selection, see Blundell et al. (2007).
12Given that di¤erent racial groups may be remunerated in di¤erent ways due to specialization or
discrimination, including these specic groups which are represented only in one sector would obviously
impair the condition of common support between sectors. The racial groups excluded from our sample
represent less than 1% of the informal sector.
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An important step in the selection is the focus on salary workers only. Self-employed
workers form a vastly heterogeneous group, from street vendors to rm owners and pro-
fessional independent workers, and deserve a specic study. We prefer to focus here on a
more homogenous comparison between salary workers in formal and informal sectors, a
choice also made in many related papers like Badaoui et al. (2008) or Tannuri-Pianto and
Pianto (2008). Arguably, comparing the earnings of dependent and independent workers
may be misleading insofar as self-employment income includes returns to risk and capital.
Our choice is not restrictive: salary workers also represent the vast majority of informal
workers in most countries. Finally, the datasets at hand allow us to dene informality in
a relatively comparable way for all countries, as described in section 2.
3.2 Wages and Tax Calculations
Real hourly wages are calculated from the gross monthly wages and reported work hours
in the primary job. For the sake of comparability between countries and over time, earn-
ings are converted into 2002 international dollars using relevant CPI deators and PPP
adjustment factors drawn from the World Development Indicators. The premium asso-
ciated with formal sector employment is overestimated if taxes and social contributions
paid by registered workers are ignored. Thus we use available information to adjust gross
wages in this sector, which is consistent with the chosen denition of formality (see similar
adjustment in Badaoui et al., 2008, for South Africa). Adjusting for taxes is sometimes
seen as a di¢ cult exercise because of data limitation. We argue that the datasets at
hand and the nature of the tax systems in the countries under study allow for a reason-
able approximation of the taxes paid on labor income.13 The tax system is progressive
in all three countries but the top marginal tax rates are not very high by international
standards in Brazil (27.5%) and Mexico (28%). Systems include a at rebate in South
Africa and a refundable and progressive tax credit for low-wage workers in Mexico. In
these two countries, income taxation is purely individualized. In Brazil, taxpayers can
also le jointly and benet from a deduction for each dependent relative (i.e., the spouse,
if inactive, and children aged under 22, or 25 if in education). We have used available
information on family links for the main adults in the household and assumed that other
adults were single. For the latter, we thus potentially overestimate tax liabilities; yet most
13Tax rules are summarized in Table A.1 in the online appendix. Detailed descriptions of the
tax-benet systems are available from the South African Revenue Service (http://www.sars.gov.za)
and from "Microsimulation models for Latin America" (Urzúa, 2012, ed.) found on: http://idl-
bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/49851/1/IDL-49851.pdf. The precise description of the imputation
process adopted in the present study is available from the authors.
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of them are young workers with low wages, and hence likely exempt from tax payment.
Another usual limitation to tax calculation is the absence of information concerning capi-
tal income, which is therefore excluded from the tax base in our simulations. This should
concern only a limited number of people at the very top of the distribution, however. We
nd that only the top 20% of the gross wage distribution is liable for income tax in all
three countries. The e¤ect of taxation on the informal wage gap is discussed below.
3.3 Data Description and the Raw Wage Gap
Table 2 describes the selected samples as homogenously as possible across countries. The
selection leaves a sample size of 13; 710 men with 27; 420 panel observations for Brazil;
9; 099 men with 20; 052 observations for South Africa; and 100; 868 men with 260; 878
observations for Mexico. Informal employment as dened above accounts for 15% of total
salary work in Brazil, 11% in South Africa and 43% in Mexico. For Brazil in particular,
this is lower than the share reported in Section 2 because of the selection. Indeed, women
and self-employed, excluded from our nal sample, are disproportionately represented in
the informal sector.
Table 2 shows that net wages are on average larger in the formal sector in all three
countries, with a larger average gap in South Africa. We also estimate the propensity to
be in the informal sector using a simple probit model. Estimates and marginal e¤ects are
reported in Table A.2 (online appendix). Results point toward a U-shaped relationship
between age and informality, that is, the young and the old workers are more likely to
be in the informal sector. In South Africa and Mexico, the probability of being formal
increases with education. For Brazil, only secondary schooling or higher (i.e., more than
11 years of schooling) guarantees a signicantly smaller probability of being informal.
The distribution of the unconditional / raw wage di¤erentials between informal and formal
sectors is depicted in panel A of Figure 1 for all three countries. The gap based on gross
wages is extremely large in South Africa, around 80% on average and between 60% and
110% along the unconditional wage distribution. In the two other countries, it is smaller
but nonetheless substantial (around 30% on average), and more uniformly distributed.
When considering net wages, we nd that progressive income taxation is responsible for
slightly decreasing the wage di¤erential across sectors in the top quarter of the distribution
of all three countries. In Mexico, the refundable tax credit subsidizes formal sector workers
in the rst three quarters of the distribution and hence increases the raw penalty faced
by informal sector workers in the lower part of the distribution. We only use net wages
in the rest of the paper.
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4 Econometric Approach
As in early studies (e.g., Marcouiller et al. 1997), we rst estimate standard Mincer wage
equations including an informal sector dummy which captures the conditional wage gap
between sectors. Other covariates comprise standard human capital information (age,
age squared and education), individual/household characteristics as reported in Table 2
(race, number of children, marital status, region) and broad industry dummies to control
for possible structural di¤erences between formal and informal sectors. Estimations are
conducted at the mean (OLS) and at various quantiles (QR) on pooled years data with
clustered standard errors. Then we control for (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity
using the panel dimension of the data. The xed e¤ects (FE) model is simply written:
yit = i + t + xit + Iit + "it
where E ["it ji; xit; Iit ] = 0 for all individuals i and periods t. The informal sector dummy
Iit takes value one if worker i is classied as informal at time t. Vector xit denotes a set
of controls, i the individual FE and "it an i.i.d. normally distributed stochastic term
accounting for possible measurement error. The coe¢ cient , interpreted as a measure
of the informal sector wage premium/penalty, is derived from the comparison between
stayers and movers, as discussed in section 2. That is, the identication of the conditional
wage gap is obtained by measuring wage changes of those moving from formal to informal
employment between two periods 1 and 2, adjusted by the wage variation of stayers in
the formal sector (control group). Indeed, the coe¢ cient  corresponds exactly to the
treatment e¤ect as measured in equation (2), that is:
 = E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 0; Ii2 = 1]  E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 0; Ii2 = 0] :
Importantly, identication is also obtained by all the other possible permutations between
statuses.14 This approach is standard but one must check that the number of transitions
across sectors is large enough for a valid use of the FE estimator. We nd that 8%
14That is:
 = E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 0; Ii2 = 1]  E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 1; Ii2 = 1]
= E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 0; Ii2 = 0]  E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 1; Ii2 = 0]
= E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 1; Ii2 = 1]  E [yi2   yi1jIi1 = 1; Ii2 = 0]
with stayers in the informal sector (lines 1 and 3 above) and those going formal (lines 2 and 3 above).
These notations do not account for possible di¤erences in the wage penalty whether it is identied on
workers moving from formal to informal sectors or on those moving in the other direction. We nonetheless
allow for possible asymmetrical e¤ects in the next section.
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of panel observations in Brazil, 12% in South Africa and 24% in Mexico correspond to
sector changes, which are reassuring numbers regarding the possibility to identify FE. We
provide further robustness checks on the validity of the approach in the next section.
The extension of the standard QR model to longitudinal data goes as follows. For any
worker i, we can write the  th quantile of the y distribution conditionally on observables
as:
F 1yit ( j xit) = i + t() + xit() + Iit(), 8 2 [0; 1]:
FE s have a pure location shift e¤ect on the conditional quantiles of the response (i.e.,
they a¤ect all quantiles in the same way). The rst FE-QR technique has been suggested
by Koenker (2004) as a direct extension of the standard quantile regression approach. A
simpler approach has been recently suggested by Canay (2011). Since individual e¤ects
i are pure location shifters, they can be estimated in a rst step by traditional mean
estimations (for instance estimation in rst di¤erences), then corrected wages byi = yi  bi
are estimated on the other covariates by traditional QR.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main Results
For each country, we report the estimated coe¢ cient b, the (conditional) informal wage
gap, at the mean (OLS, long-dashed line) and at di¤erent quantiles (QR, solid line) in
panel B of Figure 1, together with the 95% condence intervals (short-dashed lines for
OLS and shaded area for QR). In panel C, we depict mean and quantile estimates using
FE and FE-QR respectively.15 We rst comment on the series of results consistently found
in all countries.
15In Table A.3 (online appendix), we also report the wage penalty at the mean, the median and two
extreme quantiles as well as the (bootstrapped) standard errors. Because of space limitation, we have
not reported the full estimation tables  these are available from the authors. Their ndings can be
summarized as follows. Returns to education typically increase with the education level. Returns to
experience (here proxied by age) generally increase as we move to higher quantiles; the same is true for
education with a few exceptions (i.e., at lower education levels in Mexico and for university education in
South Africa). Many interpretations are possible: higher ability workers may benet from higher school
quality or obtain higher returns to a given experience/education level. Some country-specic results
also appear, for instance regional di¤erences (e.g., workers in Sao Paulo benet from higher pay) and
di¤erences by race in Brazil and South Africa.
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Baseline Results. All countries show signicant mean informal wage penalties when
using linear controls only (OLS), i.e. 62% in South Africa, 19:5% in Mexico and 11:5%
in Brazil. This is around 20 (10) points smaller than the average raw wage gaps in South
Africa and Brazil (Mexico), pointing to the signicant role of "better" observed charac-
teristics among formal employees. That is, observed endowments contribute for a quarter
of the unconditional wage gap in South Africa, a third in Mexico and two thirds in Brazil.
Large pay di¤erences nonetheless remain after controlling for observables, which may
partly be explained by unobserved factors. When accounting for time-invariant hetero-
geneity (FE), mean informal wage gaps indeed decrease by around a third in all countries,
i.e., the informal wage penalty is around 19% in South Africa, 9% in Mexico and 4% in
Brazil. That is, unobserved characteristics account for more than half of the raw wage gap
in South Africa, a third in Mexico and a quarter in Brazil. Time-invariant unobservables
are an important factor behind the apparent informal wage gap, even after controlling for
a rich set of characteristics. As always, it is not clear which specic factors are at play
in individual e¤ects. What we know is that individual e¤ects captured in FE/FE-QR
estimations are time-invariant and cannot be sector-specic (identication would require
many more years of observation). Hence they do not correspond to some unobservables
like the particular job place the worker is in, for instance. They are rather interpretable
in terms of workersunobserved skills, which may reect intrinsic talent or unobserved
school quality. This interpretation is supported by the positive correlation between ob-
served and unobserved characteristics, i.e., the fact that both observed and unobserved
characteristics are poorer among informal salary workers. Other interpretations can be
put forward, for instance the fact that formal employees may benet from more e¢ cient
networks. In any case, the remaining wage di¤erential points to the fact that formal jobs
provide higher earnings per se. In the rest of the paper, we try to interpret this result
along the di¤erent hypotheses suggested in the introduction (segmentation, bargaining
power, rm size or job attributes).
Turning to quantile estimations, we rst notice that the conditional wage gap is not even
along the distribution. With QR, the overall trend is characterized by smaller penalties at
the top of the conditional distribution. After controlling for individual e¤ects (FE-QR),
the pattern is surprisingly similar in all three countries: informal wage penalties decrease
with conditional quantiles. In other words, the largest penalties are to be found in the
left tail of the conditional earnings distribution while penalties tend to disappear at the
top. Admittedly, that the heterogeneous informal sector exacerbates wage inequality 
or, inversely, that the regulated sector compresses the wage distribution is in line with
intuition. These results are overall signicant, i.e., for all countries, FE-QR condence
bounds at the two ends of the distributions are not contained in the condence interval
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surrounding the FE coe¢ cients. The top of the South African distribution is an excep-
tion (due to the imprecise estimations for this country), yet the penalty at quantile 9 is
signicantly smaller than the penalty at quantile 1.16 Hence, quantile estimations reveal
important and signicant di¤erences along the wage distribution that are not captured
by usual estimations at the mean.
Specic Results, Interpretations and Reconciliation with the Literature: South
Africa. Our results generalize previous ndings for South Africa and help to reconcile
the apparently contrasted results in Kingdon and Knight (2007) and Badaoui et al. (2008).
The OLS wage penalty of more than 60% is in line with recent results by Kingdon and
Knight (2007). However, as noted above, more than half of it is due to unobserved het-
erogeneity. The very large contribution of unobserved skills is in line with Badaoui et al.
(2008), who estimate a FE model for South Africa. Yet, these authors nd an average
conditional wage gap close to zero while a positive informal wage penalty remains in our
case (19%). This di¤erence is likely due to the focus of these authors on the years 2001-
2003. In fact, when adding these years to our sample and interacting the sector dummy
Iit with year dummies (in order to obtain a time-varying wage gap bt), we also nd a very
marginal penalty for the early 2000s, in contrast with a sharp increase in the more recent
years. Our estimates also generalize the characterization of the informal wage penalty
to the whole conditional distribution, showing that unobserved heterogeneity matters at
all conditional quantiles. The shape is interesting, notably the fact that the conditional
wage gap is very moderate at the top but substantial at the bottom. First, this pattern
is qualitatively similar to those obtained for the two other countries, in contrast with
the idea that South Africa is very specic because of a relatively smaller informal sector
and the presence of unemployment. Second, our results point to the huge heterogeneity
characterizing informal employment in South Africa. On the one hand, the penalty faced
by workers in the low-tier informal sector is especially large in this country, which sup-
ports the view that the legal context matters, as discussed in section 2. Some workers
cannot access formal jobs, nor can they "a¤ord" to remain unemployed. They are likely
underpaid compared to workers beneting from binding minimum wages and stronger
bargaining power due to unionization. On the other hand, informal wage penalties are
smaller than 20% for the upper half of the conditional distribution and smaller than 10%
16Arguably, the distribution of the conditional wage gap appears atter in the middle of the distribution
for Brazil so that only the gaps at the two tails are out of the condence intervals of estimations at the
mean (FE). As suggested by a referee, we have tested di¤erences between two successive quantiles, from
:1 to :9 (Q:1  Q:2; Q:2  Q:3; etc). Out of these 8 di¤erences, 6 are statistically signicant in Brazil, 5 in
South Africa and all of them in Mexico. Detailed results are available from the authors.
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for the upper quarter, pointing to a large segment of unregistered work which is more
comparable to the situation in Latin American countries.
Specic Results, Interpretations and Reconciliation with the Literature: Brazil
and Mexico. For Brazil, studies report evidence of signicant earnings di¤erentials that
may favor the segmentation hypothesis (Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto, 2002, Botelho and
Ponczek, 2011). Yet evidence is mixed. Carneiro and Henley (2001) show that for some
workers, the informal sector may be a desirable form of employment in Brazil. They
nd that much of the large informal wage gap can be explained by selection bias and
consequently favor the competitive markets hypothesis. Our results actually point to
modest wage penalties in the rst quarter of the conditional distribution (15% with QR
and around 7% when accounting for FE) and small or insignicant penalties higher up.
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) obtain the same pattern as ours, at least qualitatively.
Interestingly, they use an alternative approach based on IV-QR. This similarity is en-
couraging and more systematic comparisons of the two methods for the same country
and the same period should be carried out. Quantitatively, however, conditional gaps are
relatively small at all levels in our results, which is more consistent with the competitive
view supported by Carneiro and Henley (2001). Di¤erences in magnitude between our
estimates and those of Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) may partly be explained by
(i) the fact that wage penalties are not identied on the same group of workers, (ii) the
fact that formal wages are not adjusted for the e¤ect of taxes and (iii) some of the limi-
tations discussed in section 2 regarding the instruments used to identify the informality
e¤ect (note that the evidence by Carneiro and Henley, 2001, also hinges on the validity
of their instruments). More recent work by Botelho and Ponczek (2011) provides a ro-
bust approach combining instruments and FE estimations on panel data. They obtain an
informal (gross) wage penalty of 8% on average, close to our 4% estimate.
Mexico turns out to be an intermediary case. The conditional wage gap ranges from 15%
(32% when ignoring FE) at the bottom of the distribution to zero (5%) at the top. Like
in the two other countries, accounting for unobservable skills considerably decreases the
extent of the penalty, i.e., workers negatively select into informal employment. Our results
indicate that the nature of the Mexican labor market is not fundamentally di¤erent from
that of Brazil. The literature has pointed to a Mexican specicity only when it comes
to self-employed workers, as discussed in section 2. It is characterized by the existence
of informal self-employment premia on average (e.g., Marcouiller et al., 1997, Maloney,
1999) and particularly at the top of the conditional distribution (cf., Bargain and Kwenda,
2011). When focusing on salary workers as we do here, an informal wage penalty is found
on average, slightly larger than in Brazil in the lower conditional quantiles. This result
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indicates that the real situation of informal salary workers can be masked by lumping
them together with self-employed workers, as done in some studies.
Complementary forces may be at work to explain modest penalties in Latin America.
First, stringent employment protection legislation provide formal sector employers with
an incentive to employ workers on a temporary basis so that some of the employees of
formal sector rms are likely to be de facto informal employees. This could explain why
in some segment of the labor market, informal and formal workers are relatively similar 
this is especially true in the upper part of the conditional distribution, as further analyzed
below. Second, informal wage penalties due to formal sector collective bargaining may
partly disappear if rms want to recoup the high costs of formal labor. Increasing skill
substituability between formal and informal workers may also decrease wage bargaining
power in the formal sector, which is what we likely observe in the upper conditional
quantiles.
Combining Propensity Score and Fixed E¤ects. The preliminary conclusions
above are based on a series of assumptions that require proper robustness checks. First,
our quantile estimations imposed a linearity assumption on the e¤ect of controls. To bet-
ter account for di¤erent distributions of observables between informal and formal sector
workers, we suggest combining FE-QR with a direct matching technique, i.e., a propen-
sity score reweighting. The propensity to be in the informal sector, denoted p, can be
estimated by binary models using the set of variables that can potentially inuence par-
ticipation in the informal market and the wage rate. Figure A.1 (online appendix) depicts
the distributions of the propensity scores for the formal and informal sector workers re-
spectively. The distributions are fairly di¤erent between the two groups, especially in
South Africa and Mexico. We follow the suggestion of Firpo (2007) and reweight the
observations by the inverse propensity score in quantile estimations. The weights used
are 1=p and 1=(1   p) for informal and formal sector workers respectively. Precisely, we
rst estimate mean FE models, then estimate traditional QR on the FE-adjusted wages,
consistently using weighted observations in each of these steps. Bootstrapped standard
errors give condence intervals at each quantile that we report in panel A of Figure 2. It
turns out that relaxing the linearity assumption does not fundamentally a¤ect the pattern
found in the baseline estimations.17 This is reassuring and indicates that the potential
17We have simply checked that all observations verify the common support assumption. However, a
drawback of the reweighting procedure is that the results may become rather unstable as the propensity
gets close to 0 or 1. While the number of observations with 0 < p < :05 (formal sector) or :95 < p < 1
(informal sector) is only 5% in Brazil and 7% in Mexico, it is relatively large in South Africa (20%),
leading to a large fanning-out of the condence interval at the two ends of the distribution.
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lack of common supportbetween the two sectors is not an issue in our case.
Short Panel Issue and Correlated Random E¤ect Model. In the case of nonlinear
operators like QR, FE are not estimated consistently when the number of time periods
is small and this inconsistency is transmitted to the estimators of the other covariates of
interest (Koenker, 2004, discusses this incidental parameters problem in the case of QR).
We provide two additional results to address this issue. First, we conduct a straightforward
check that consists in estimating the model separately on samples of 5-year stayers, 4-year
stayers, etc. A systematic relationship between the length of the panel and the results
would be worrying. We report results in the rst two graphs of panel B in Figure 2, for
South Africa and Mexico respectively, i.e., the two countries with more than two periods
of observations. Results are very similar to the baseline note however that the small
sample size for South Africa explains some divergence at the two tails of the distribution.
Second, we estimate a QR model with correlated random e¤ect (CRE), as suggested by
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008). This Chamberlain-Mundlak model does not su¤er from the
incidental parameters problem. It deals with potential correlation between covariates and
unobserved heterogeneity by assuming some restricted dependency, namely that unob-
servables i are linearly correlated with the explanatory variables. Thus, in the simple
approach à la Mundlak, unobservables are modeled as the mean values of time-varying
covariates (over all periods) plus a normally distributed term. Note that this approach
requires balanced panels. Results are presented in the top-right graph of panel B in Fig-
ure 2 for Brazil (2-period panel) and in the lower panel B for South Africa (4-period
panel) and Mexico (2-period and 4-period panels we provide only two panel sizes for
illustration but consistent ndings are found in the other cases). These new estimates
are consistent with the FE-QR results, even if the conditional wage gap is now larger.
Note that this may simply be due to the restrictive account for individual e¤ects in the
CRE-QR. It is nonetheless interesting to see that an alternative estimator, relying on
di¤erent assumptions and characterized by di¤erent limitations (see Canay, 2011), points
to similar results.
Alternative Specications and the Role of Firm Size. We check how results vary
with the type of control used in the specication of the wage estimation and notably with
the inclusion of rm size. Indeed, one possible explanation for informal wage penalties,
mentioned in the introduction but not investigated so far, is the rm size e¤ect (see
Badaoui et al., 2010). For this sensitivity analysis, we cannot use FE-QR since time-
invariant characteristics are captured in individual e¤ects. Hence, we rely on simple QR
on pooled data and begin with a basic model including only standard human capital and
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individual/household characteristics (X1). Next, we add a series of additional control
variables which are arguably endogenous, i.e. industry / occupation types and rm size
(X2). Our baseline is an intermediate case without rm size. Results are reported in
panel A of Figure 3. Adding industry types or occupation types does not change results
much (not reported). In contrast, adding rm size decreases the informal wage penalty.
This is expected given that rm size is likely to be correlated with our "informal sector"
dummy Iit if the legalistic denition of informality overlaps to some extent with the rm
size classication (see the discussion in section 2.3). Further investigations show that in
our data, those classied in the formal sector according to the legalistic approach are most
often in rms of more than ve employees (86% of them in South Africa up to 95% in
Brazil). Yet, the overlap is less perfect for those classied in the informal sector according
to the legalistic view: 21% of them are working in large rms in South Africa, 32% in
Mexico and up to 68% in Brazil (aforementioned studies on Brazil actually report that
tax evasion is not limited to small and medium-size enterprises, as is commonly believed).
Hence, many informal workers are simply unregistered workers within large rms this
is especially true at the top of the distribution and consistent with our nds that wages
are equalized across sectors for the most productive workers.18 More generally, while rm
size may explain some of the wage penalty, the other explanations suggested in our main
analysis remain valid.
5.2 Checking for Measurement Errors and Additional Results
We further discuss possible issues related to the method at use. We rst cover the usual
concerns about the validity of FE estimations. Since the identication relies on sector
movers, we check that recorded moves are not imputable to measurement errors but
correspond to genuine job changes. We also check that movers are not too specic. For
that purpose, we show that moves are not limited to a specic part of the distribution
and that results are not driven by the specic nature of job movers. Keeping in mind the
possibility of non-random selection, and because the (unobserved) reasons for transitioning
in one or the other direction may be di¤erent, we allow for possibly di¤erent wage penalties
18To better characterize top wage workers in the informal sector, we run a probit with the binary
variable taking a value of one if the worker is in the top quintile of this sector. Among signicant
coe¢ cients, we nd that in all countries, the top paid are more often located in economically active areas
(e.g., the Sao Paulo region in Brazil), generally have higher education levels (with the exception of South
Africa where they more often hold a vocational degree) and more often hold managerial or administrative
positions. The presence of unregistered workers in large rms is especially true at the top in Brazil:
around 86% (resp. 53%) of informal workers in the top quintile (resp. lower quintiles) are located in
rms with 11 or more employees.
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depending on the direction of the move. Finally, we check how the informal wage penalty
varies with workersheterogeneity.
Measurement Errors. Admittedly, inter-sector moves could reect mere measurement
error, i.e., aws in reporting the correct sector status at certain periods. Hence we rst
verify whether sector transitions are accompanied by actual job changes. We classify
any person who reports less than 6 months of tenure as someone who has started a
new job. Since tenure information can be missing (or itself contaminated with reporting
error), we also associate job moves with signicant changes in rm size and changes in
occupation and industry (using the most disaggregated categories available in the data).
Of all sector moves, which potentially include several moves per worker over the relevant
period, 75% in Brazil, 87% in South Africa and 80% in Mexico are accompanied by a
change in at least one of these characteristics (detailed results available from the authors).
"Unexplained" cases may correspond to reporting errors or to persons who remained in the
same job but whose status has been changed by their employer. In both cases, the wage
of these workers is expected not to change much over time and this group may actually
contribute to nding small informal sector penalties. We rerun the FE-QR estimations
after excluding observations corresponding to sector moves unexplained by job moves.
Results are reported in the panel B of Figure 3. The penalty becomes larger in the lower
quantiles for South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in the middle of the distribution for
Brazil. Nonetheless, this variant is reassuringly similar to the baseline and shows that our
results are not driven by measurement errors.19
Characterizing Sector Movers. We also check that movers are not too specic. First,
we verify that transitions across sectors are large enough at quantile levels and are not
restricted to certain groups of workers. Figure A.2 (online appendix) depicts the number
of movers in and out of the informal sector between two periods, averaged over the di¤erent
waves of the panel, and expressed as a proportion of the size of base-period informal sector
quintiles. It turns out that a substantial number of workers move in both directions and
do so at all earnings levels. Transitions are slightly more frequent in the upper quintiles in
South Africa and Mexico and occur more often from informal to formal sector (especially
19Note that changes in rm size do not fully guarantee that a job change has actually occurred. Yet,
if a rm expands dramatically over one year, it may become more at risk of being caught defaulting
on stipulated regulation and is therefore more likely to register its workers. At the same time, it may
also change its wage setting policy see Badaoui et al. (2010). Then, a substantial change in the rm
structure/size may be treated as a reasonable approximation for job/rm change. We nonetheless include
a variant where rm size change is not used as a proxy for job move in Figure 3, panel B.
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in Mexico and in lower quintiles in Brazil). Overall, however, they do not seem to be
overly concentrated at certain levels of the wage distribution.
Second, we characterize sector movers by running additional probits (dependent variable
equals to one if the worker moves). It turns out that movers are not extremely di¤erent
from the overall selected population in terms of their observed characteristics (pseudo-
R2 are around :02 for Brazil, 0.06 for South Africa and :01 for Mexico). Only a few
characteristics are signicant. Movers seem to be younger, less educated and more often
single. This picture applies more systematically to those moving from informal to formal
sectors. According to our estimations, however, those moving in this direction are not
fundamentally di¤erent from workers going in the other direction. Note also that moves
occur more frequently within certain industries (e.g., construction and trade in Brazil)
and that better wage prospects explain only very partly why people move. Transitions
are associated with wage increases for some workers only, mainly grouped in the upper
part of the distribution.
Third, sector movers may be specic in as much as they belong to the category of job
movers. Indeed, job movers may be very di¤erent from job stayers as emphasized by
human capital models or job-matching models (cf., Farber, 1999). We rst check that job
moves are not systematically associated to sector moves. Using a conservative denition of
job changes(excluding changes in rm size), we nd that a majority actually corresponds
to moves within the same sector (71% in Mexico, 80% in South Africa, 87% in Brazil).
We also estimate FE-QR on job movers only, so that the control groupis now only those
who change jobs while staying in the same sector, either formal or informal. According
to the panel C in Figure 4, results appear not to be fundamentally di¤erent from our
baseline, indicating that the inclusion of job stayers did not lead to a noticeable bias in
the baseline penalty estimation. With a conservative measure of job movers, however, the
conditional penalty tends to be larger in the upper part of the South African distribution.
Testing for Asymmetrical E¤ects. Another aspect of the identication strategy that
merits discussion is the assumption that the wage penalty is the same for those that move
from the informal sector to the formal sector as it is for those that move in the opposite
direction. This is not an issue if all the unobservable heterogeneity is time-invariant, as
assumed in the FE estimator. However, the transition could be explained by time-specic
shocks on worker/job characteristics as discussed in section 2. With the traditional view
that jobs are "better" in the formal sector, one would expect that moves into the informal
sector are more often the result of negative shocks so that the penalty identied on workers
moving in this direction should be larger. We replicate our results when including only
one type of transition at a time. Graphs in the panel D of Figure 4 show that results are
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not fundamentally asymmetrical: results with one or the other type of transition are not
statistically di¤erent, with exceptions in the middle of the distributions. In particular,
results for South Africa conrm that the informal sector wage penalty is larger when
identied on the transitions into informality. This is not veried for Latin American
countries.
Between-Group Variation. The FE-QR model simply includes a dummy variable for
the informal sector and may be seen as misspecied. While in case of misspecication,
least square regressions provide a minimum mean squared error linear approximation to
the true functions, Angrist et al. (2006) provide a similar result for QR. Therefore our
ndings have a meaningful interpretation even if the true informal wage penalty depends
on the covariates. Nonetheless, we relax the assumption that returns to education and
experience are identical in the two sectors and examine the heterogeneity of the informal
wage penalty by simply interacting it with workersage and education levels. Detailed
results, available from the authors, essentially show that younger workers face larger
penalties at all percentiles, especially in Brazil and South Africa. This is in line with
the traditional view that the informal sector is, for some younger workers, a temporary
state where they can gain some training (Bosch and Maloney, 2007). Education levels
seem to a¤ect the wage gap only at the two extremes of the distribution. At the top,
the informal wage penalty is smaller in all countries and even turns into a premium in
Brazil  for those with higher education. This is in line with results from Arbex et al.
(2010) who show that returns to education are higher for informal workers in the top of
the conditional distribution. In lower quantiles, we nd that a larger penalty occurs for
those with higher education in Brazil and Mexico. This possibly reects that in this part
of the distribution, education has a higher return in the formal sector, either because it
acts as a signaling device or because this sector is capital-intensive and highly rewarded
as a complement to capital inputs. This result and its interpretations are consistent with
those in Gong and Van Soest (2002).
6 Concluding Discussion
The present study suggests a very comprehensive empirical approach to estimate informal
employment wage penalties along the conditional wage distribution in South Africa, Mex-
ico and Brazil. We adjust for taxes paid in the formal sector, control for time-invariant
unobservables using panel information and relax the linearity assumption on observables
using propensity score weighting. Applying this empirical approach uniformly to all three
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countries, and using comparable denitions of informality, allow performing sound inter-
national comparisons. Results are robust to using relatively short panels, to measurement
errors and to model misspecication.
We nd a series of consistent results for all countries: Estimations along the conditional
distribution point to large within-group heterogeneity, with a signicant informal wage
penalty observed at the bottom of the conditional distribution and disappearing at the
top. The informal (formal) sector increases wage dispersion (compression), which is an
important aspect of overall wage inequality in developing countries. Workers in the formal
sector have both better observed and unobserved skills, and the latter are responsible for
a substantial share of the unconditional earnings gap in all countries. The informal wage
gap does not boil down to a rm size e¤ect.
Beyond these common features, the informal wage penalty shows di¤erent magnitudes in
the three countries. Largest penalties are to be found in the lower conditional quantiles
of South Africa. While it is hard to judge the extent to which wage penalties compensate
for net gains in non-cash attributes attached to informal employment, wage gaps in an
order of 25 35%, our condence interval for quantile 1 in South Africa, seem more in line
with the traditional view of a low-tier informal sector (Kingdon and Knight, 2007). For
this group, policy action is required to limit labor market rigidities, at least those which
leave informal workers out of formal activities, and to improve the nancial conditions
of informal workers. Nonetheless, the fact that the wage penalty is not constant along
the distribution suggests that policies aimed to levy labor market regulation should not
be applied in a blanket fashion. Arguably, the fact that raw wage gaps are larger than
conditional gaps highlights the role of human capital and suggests that the key to more
equitable labor markets fundamentally also pertains to additional e¤orts towards building
workerscapabilities. Yet, the prevailing role is played by unobserved abilities so that
further research should better dene the nature of these skills.
For Brazil and Mexico, informal wage penalties are more modest all along the distribution.
Labor market regulations likely explain the extent of informality in these countries and
possibly the necessity for rms to recoup some of the labor costs on formal job pay, which
could partly explain lower informal wage gaps. While some studies conclude about the
presence of dualistic labor markets in Brazil (Botelho and Ponczek, 2011), our estimates
provide weak support to this hypothesis. Modest pay gaps, lower than 10%, all along
the conditional distribution are more in line with the view of relatively integrated labor
markets. This conclusion is shared by the upper half in Mexico. So far, Mexican labor
markets were viewed as relatively competitive in studies focusing on the self employed
(Maloney, 1999, Marcoullier et al., 1997). These results are also consistent with the fact
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that sector mobility is not as restricted as the traditional dualistic view would predict
(see Ulyssea, 2010, for Brazil). If any, segmentation in the two Latin American countries
would concern only a fraction of workers in the lower conditional quantiles and other
interpretations can possibly explain larger penalties in the lower tail, notably di¤erences
in bargaining power across sectors (Carneiro and Henley, 1998). Improving workersca-
pacities seem also important in these countries especially in Brazil where it accounts for
two-third of the unconditional sector wage gap. More skill substitutability between formal
and informal workers would also contribute to discipline formal sector wage bargaining.
Future research should address several limitations. Longer panel with movers changing
sector several times could be used to measure the distributional shifts due to individual
heterogeneity. Moreover, wage gap measures are only part of a more complete welfare
analysis. As Badaoui et al. (2008), we have attempted to account for taxes and social
contributions to improve the rending of nancial situations in the formal sector. However,
we do not know how much of the tax wedge is already absorbed in gross wages, and a more
complete model of labor demand and supply would be required to measure tax incidence.
Moreover, taxes represent only part of the factors that a¤ect net earnings. Accounting
for other cash or non-pecuniary advantages attached to a particular sector represents a
considerable challenge but a necessary improvement.
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Table 1: Estimation Techniques and Informality Denition in Related Studies
mean quantiles IV Panelestimation
Matching or
PS weighting
Cichello et al (2005) South Africa (SA) productive (2*) yes# no - - -
Kingdon and Knight (2004) South Africa (SA) social security (a) yes no yes no no
Badaoui et al. (2008) South Africa (SA) social security (a) yes no no yes yes
Maloney (1999) Mexico (M) productive (1) yes no no no no
Gong and Van Soest (2002) Mexico (M) productive (2) yes no @
Calderon-Madrid (1999) Mexico (M) social security (a) yes## no no no yes
Carneiro and Henley (2001) Brazil (B) social security (b) yes no yes no no
Botelho and Ponczek (2011) Brazil (B) social security (b) yes no $ yes yes no
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008) Brazil (B) social security (b) yes yes yes no no
The present study SA, M and B social security (a,b) yes yes no yes yes
Funkhouser (1997) El Salvador (ES) productive (1, 2, 2*) yes# no no yes no
Pratap and Quintin (2006) Argentina (A) social security (a,b) yes no no yes yes
Marcouiller et al. (1997) ES, M and Peru productive (1, 2) yes no yes no no
Gong et al. (2004) Mexico (M) soc. sec. (a), prod. (1,2) @ - -
Bosch and Maloney (2007) M, B and A social security (a,b) - - -
Amuedo-Dorantes (2004) Chile social security (b) yes no no
(1) firm size (informal = worker in firm of less than five employees, excluding professionals (ex. doctor))
(2) nature/type of the job (informal = piece-workers and own-account workers, formal = fixed wage, cooperative workers, professionals)
(2*) nature/type of the job (informal = casual wage, in non-professional self-employment or in domestic service)
(a) informal = do not receive fringe benefits / social security coverage, do not pay social security contributions, not registered with the social security agency
(b) informal = not holding a signed labor card
# measured using wage changes due transitions across sectors
## model search and sector mobility
$ separate estimations on earnings quartiles
@ dynamic multinomial logit panel data model with random effects (equations for sector choice and wages, with exclusion restrictions)
measure transition across sectors
measure transition across sectors
effect of informality on poverty
Accounting for selection into sectors:
Study Country Informal sector definition
Conditional wage gap estimated at:
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Table 2: Selected Samples: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Gross hourly wage 4.77 3.53 2.54 0.99 2.77 2.30
(6.94) (4.92) (3.67) (1.60) (2.33) (1.96)
Net hourly wage 4.43 3.53 2.39 0.99 2.75 2.30
(5.52) (4.92) (3.07) (1.60) (1.91) (1.96)
Demographics
Age 36.5 35.9 38.5 38.9 34.6 32.1
# children 3.2 3.3 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.6
household size 3.8 3.9 5.9 6.3 4.6 4.9
% married 0.64 0.54 0.63 0.47 0.62 0.44
Black 0.07 0.07 Black 0.74 0.86
Brown 0.32 0.33 Coloured 0.26 0.14
White 0.61 0.60
Education
No Schooling 0.01 0.01 No schooling 0.09 0.15 No Schooling 0.02 0.04
1-3 years 0.04 0.04 Primary 0.31 0.40 1-3 years 0.04 0.08
4-7 years 0.24 0.24 Secondary 0.53 0.42 4-7 years 0.24 0.34
8-10 years 0.18 0.18 Vocational 0.07 0.03 8-10 years 0.45 0.40
11+ years 0.53 0.53 University 0.001 0.00 11+ years 0.25 0.13
Province
Recife 0.06 0.04 Western Cape 0.21 0.11 > 100,000 Inhab. 0.72 0.56
Salvador 0.07 0.06 Eastern Cape 0.09 0.16 15,000-99,999 0.11 0.17
Belo Horizonte 0.16 0.11 Northern Cape 0.08 0.05 2,500-14,999 0.08 0.14
Rio de Janeiro 0.27 0.35 Free State 0.11 0.08 < 2,500 0.08 0.13
Sao Paulo 0.25 0.29 Kwazulu-Natal 0.11 0.14





Manufacturing 0.32 0.19 0.36 0.08 0.39 0.20
Construction 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.37
Trade & Retail 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.15 0.26 0.16
Services 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.09
Transport and Comm. 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.18
# panel observations
# workers
Share of informal sector




Statistics concern the selected sample of male aged 15-65, neither in education nor in the public sector. Data covers the period 2002-2007 for Brazil,




























































































The graphs represent the raw informal vs. formal sector wage gap at different (unconditional) quantiles; the black (grey) line
depicts the raw gross (net) wage gap
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Quantile
Brazil
The graphs represent the (conditional) log wage gap between informal and formal sectors at different quantiles estimated
by OLS (long dashed line) and QR (solid line); bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented by the short dashed
lines (OLS) and the grey areas (QR)



































































.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Quantile
Brazil
The graphs represent the (conditional) log wage gap between informal and formal sectors at different quantiles estimated
by FE (long dashed line) and FEQR (solid line); bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals are represented by the short dashed
lines (FE) and the grey areas (FEQR)
Panel C: Conditional Wage Gaps: FE and FEQR Estimates
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basel ine FEQR 2-year panel



















For South Africa and Mexico, we compare baseline with FE-QR estimations on (balanced) panels of different size.
For Brazil (2-year panel), we compare baseline with the conditional random effect QR (CRE-QR)
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Quantile
Mexico (4-year)
For South Africa and Mexico, we compare baseline with the conditional random effect QR (CRE-QR)
on balanced panels of 2 or 4 years










































































We compare QR estimates for the baseline specification (covariates = human capital and industry)
to estimates using specifications X1 (human capital only) or X2 (human capital, industry and firm size)









































































We compare baseline to estimates obtained when excluding sample sector moves that are NOT explained
by job moves, with the latter proxied by significant changes in (1) tenure, occupation, industry and firm size,
or in (2) tenure, occupation and industry
Panel B: Excluding Sector Moves Unexplained by Job Moves










































































We compare baseline to estimates obtained when restricting sample to job movers only, with job moves proxied
by significant changes in (1) tenure, occupation, industry and firm size, or in (2) tenure, occupation and industry






















































We check for potential asymmetries by compare estimates when restricting sample to movers from formal to informal,
and to movers from informal to formal
Panel D: Checking for Potential Asymmetries in the Wage Penalty
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Movers in/out of the Informal Sector
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Brazil 0 … 10,485 0.0 … 1.3 0%
10,486 … 20,971 1.3 … 2.6 15%
20,971 + 2.6 + 27.5%
South Africa 0 … 9,091 0.0 … 0.6 0%
9,091 … 13,468 0.6 … 0.9 18%
13,468 … 26,936 0.9 … 1.7 25%
26,936 … 37,037 1.7 … 2.4 30%
37,037 … 57,239 2.4 … 3.7 35%
57,239 … 80,808 3.7 … 5.2 38%
80,808 + 5.2 + 40%
Mexico 0 … 656 0.0 … 0.1 1.9%
656 … 5,570 0.1 … 1.0 6.4%
5,570 … 9,789 1.0 … 1.8 10.9%
9,789 … 11,379 1.8 … 2.1 16%
11,379 … 13,624 2.1 … 2.5 17.9%
13,624 … 27,478 2.5 … 5.0 19.9%
27,478 … 43,309 5.0 … 7.9 22%
43,309 + 7.9 + 28%
in 2002 PPP$ in % of median income
brackets (annual income)
A tax rebate of PPP$ 1,636
also applies for all @
Othersmarginalrate
Notes: this table summarizes the tax schedules in force in Brazil, South Africa and Mexico in years 2002, 2002 and 2007 respectively. Our
calculations also account for structural changes and nominal adjustments of tax bands occurring at other years. We also account for different
treatments of different groups. E.g., for persons aged 65+ in South Africa, there is no second bracket, the theshold to the third is 14,356 and the
rebate is increased by 1,010.
@ The upper threshold of the first positive-rate bracket (0.6 and 0.1 times the median income in South Africa and Mexico respectively) is effectively
higher (around 1.2 the median income) because of the rebate/tax credit.
# Hence someone at the end of the 2nd bracket (5,570) has a negative net tax liability of -178; someone close to the end of the 3rd bracket has to
pay a net tax of about 500
People with earnings in the
first 3 brackets also receive a
refundable tax credit from
PPP$ 538 (for zero earnings)
down to PPP$ 288 @ #
Table A.1: Tax Schedules
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Variable
Coeff. Std. Err Marg. Eff. Coeff. Std. Err Marg. Eff. Coeff. Std. Err Marg. Eff.
Demographics Ref:
Age -0.094 (0.006) -0.021 -0.068 (0.015) -0.008 -0.064 (0.002) -0.025
Age squared 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 0.001 (0.000) 0.000
# children -0.025 (0.014) -0.005 0.091 (0.021) 0.009 -0.002 (0.002) -0.001
household size 0.033 (0.013) 0.007 -0.022 (0.010) -0.003 0.024 (0.001) 0.009
Married -0.200 (0.023) -0.045 -0.281 (0.061) 0.002 -0.320 (0.006) -0.125
Black -0.072 (0.039) -0.015 Coloured -0.246 (0.087) -0.022
Brown -0.031 (0.024) -0.007
Education Ref:
1-3 Years 0.134 (0.087) 0.031 Primary -0.331 (0.080) -0.029 1-3 Years -0.153 (0.020) -0.058
4-7 Years 0.110 (0.079) 0.025 Secondary -0.976 (0.087) -0.096 4-7 Years -0.320 (0.017) -0.122
8-10 Years 0.027 (0.080) 0.006 Vocational -1.501 (0.143) -0.074 8-10 Years -0.580 (0.017) -0.221
11+ Years -0.178 (0.079) -0.039 University -1.597 (0.849) -0.070 11+ Years -0.797 (0.018) -0.281
Province Ref:
Salvador 0.053 (0.057) 0.012 Eastern Cape 0.938 (0.105) 0.115 15,000-99,999 0.352 (0.008) 0.139
Belo Horizonte -0.071 (0.050) -0.015 Northern Cape 0.203 (0.119) 0.018 2,500-14,999 0.456 (0.009) 0.180
Rio de Janeiro 0.240 (0.047) 0.056 Free State 0.161 (0.121) 0.016 < 2,500 0.302 (0.009) 0.120
Sao Paulo 0.289 (0.048) 0.068 Kwazulu-Natal 0.515 (0.113) 0.070
Porto Alegre 0.052 -(0.028) 0.009 North West 0.608 (0.115) 0.040
Gauteng 0.412 (0.114) 0.022
Mpumalanga 0.223 (0.120) 0.133
Limpopo 0.994 (0.130) 0.058
Economic sector Ref:
Manufacturing -0.668 (0.036) -0.126 -1.521 (0.088) -0.098 -1.069 (0.008) -0.371
Trade & Retail -0.270 (0.035) -0.055 -1.041 (0.082) -0.071 -0.916 (0.009) -0.315
Services -0.352 (0.036) -0.070 0.075 (0.077) 0.003 -0.846 (0.010) -0.285
Transport and Comm -0.471 (0.041) -0.085 0.143 (0.100) 0.015 -0.092 (0.010) -0.035
Other 0.136 (0.068) 0.032 -1.494 (0.077) -0.122 -0.283 (0.011) -0.107
Period Ref:
2003 -0.028 (0.046) -0.006 2002 -0.242 (0.069) -0.022 2006 0.008 (0.008) 0.003
2004 0.017 (0.044) 0.004 2003 -0.180 (0.080) -0.019 2007 0.007 (0.008) 0.003
2005 -0.007 (0.044) -0.001 2004 -0.072 (0.090) -0.009 2008 -0.372 (0.008) -0.140
2006 -0.023 (0.043) -0.005 2005 0.082 (0.091) 0.015
2007 -0.077 (0.047) -0.016 2006 0.115 (0.092) 0.013
2007 0.171 (0.093) 0.021
Constant 1.024 (0.149) 0.685 (0.316) 2.184 (0.032)
Dependent variable = 1 if informal sector. Standard errors are in brackets.
Construction









Brazil South Africa Mexico
black, single Single
Table A.2: Probit: Propensity to be in the Informal Sector
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coef. std.err. coef. std.err coef. std.err coef. std.err
OLS and pooled QR
Brazil -0.115 0.012 -0.148 0.010 -0.126 0.020 -0.060 0.015
South Africa -0.627 0.025 -0.627 0.036 -0.689 0.035 -0.582 0.028
Mexico -0.195 0.003 -0.274 0.005 -0.201 0.002 -0.120 0.004
FE and FE-QR
Brazil -0.043 0.007 -0.065 0.012 -0.041 0.003 -0.026 0.009
South Africa -0.188 0.027 -0.288 0.043 -0.179 0.017 -0.112 0.030
Mexico -0.087 0.003 -0.131 0.002 -0.087 0.001 -0.045 0.002
Informal wage penalty = estimated coefficient of the informal sector dummy. All estimations based on the variables reported in the descriptive statistics, except time-
invariant characteristics (race, education and region) in the fixed effects estimations.
Mean Q=0.2 Q=0.5 Q=0.8
Estimation methods
Table A.3: Informal Wage Gap: Summary of Estimation Results
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